JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. We reconsider the traditional problem of fair division. Division principles should be general enough to accommodate changes in what is to be divided as well as variations in the number of agents among whom the division is to take place. In the usual treatment of the question, this number is assumed to be fixed. Here, we explicitly allow it to vary.
1. Introduction. We reconsider here the problem of fair division. A division problem arises when agents in some group have conflicting preferences over the possible divisions of a list of items to which they are collectively entitled. A division principle or solution proposes an equitable resolution of all division problems in a given class.
In the usual study of the question, the number of agents n is assumed to be fixed; the present paper allows for variations in n and investigates the existence of division principles which in addition to satisfying a few standard properties, respond appropriately to such variations.
To illustrate what we mean by "appropriately" we take as our starting point the particular outcome reached by applying a given division principle to a specific division problem faced by some group of agents; then, we let an additional agent enter the scene.
We require that the new agent be placed on the same footing as the original agents: all agents have the "same" claims on the aggregate resources. This means that some of these resources will have to be transferred to him, and if the initial distribution was efficient, as we will also demand, some of the original agents will typically lose. It is conceivable, however, that some of them will gain and it is this phenomenon that we will forbid: all of the original agents should share in the new responsibilities of the group. If sacrifices have to be made to support one more person, all should participate.
Although the division of a bundle of goods is important to motivate this paper, we have adopted a somewhat more abstract formulation. We assume agents to have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions and we define division problems as subsets of the utility space in a certain class. We investigate the existence of division principles defined on that class and satisfying several axioms: on the one hand, the familiar axioms of weak Pareto-optimality, anonymity, scale invariance and continuity; and on the other the new axiom of monotonicity with respect to changes in the number of agents informally described above. We show that there is a unique division principle that satisfies them all: it is the natural generalization of the two-person solution proposed by Kalai and Smorodinsky [2] , subsequently referred to as the KS solution.
The paper is organized as follows: ?2 sets up the framework of analysis. ?3 presents the results, the proof of the main theorem being given only for a simple case. ?4 is devoted to some final remarks. The appendix contains a general proof of the main theorem. Anonymity (An). For all P, P' E P with IP| = IP'I, for all one-to-one functions Y from P to P', for all S E E2, for all S' E 2E', if S' = {x' e E 2'l x e S s.t. Vi E P, x'y(I = x), then for all i E P, F)(S') = F/(S). Given P in .', let A" be the class of functions X from Re into Re defined as follows: for each i in P, there exists a positive real number a, such that for each x in R., X (x)-=a,x. 
Given S in 2", X(S) is defined to be fy E R 3x S s.t. y X= (x)). Note that X(S) is also in 2". Scale Invariance (S. Inv.). For all P E A, for all S E 2e, for all X E A", FP(X(S)) = A(F(S)).
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DIVISION OF FIXED SUPPLY AMONG GROWING POPULATION
Monotonicity with respect to changes in the number of agents (Mon). For all P, Q E ~ with P C Q, for all S e p, for all T E Q, if S = Tn RP, then for all i E P, Fip(S) > FiQ(T). (We write S = T n Rp with a slight abuse of notation.)
All of these axioms, except Mon, are familiar axioms, appropriately reformulated for the situation under study. Mon relates solution outcomes across cardinalities: T is the division problem faced by the large group Q. S is the division problem that the members of the subgroup P of Q would face if the rights of the agents in Q \P were ignored and each of them were assigned utility 0. The requirement is that none of the members of P should end up better off after the rights of the agents in Q \P have been recognized.
Other Notations. Given P in 9, e denotes the vector of R P which has all of its coordinates equal to 1. Given P in i, m subsets SI. . ., Sm of RP , n points x . . ., x n of R +, ccht{S, . . ., Sm;xI, . . .X, Xn} denotes the convex and comprehensive hull of T --S1 U ... U Sm U ({x, . . , x"}, i.e., it is the smallest convex and comprehensive subset of R P containing T. PROOF. We will limit ourselves here to proving the statement for the case when P has cardinality 2. This case lends itself to a simple geometric illustration (Figure 1 ). The case of P's of arbitrary cardinality is given in the appendix.
We first observe that by An, Fp depends only on the cardinality of P. To fix the ideas, we then choose P = {1,2} and we observe that by S. Inv it is enough to prove PROOF. Suppose by way of contradiction that for some P in a and some S in 5Ep, it is not the case thaty _ x, wherey -FP(S) and x --KP(S). Let io in P be such that Yi = miniep Yi b. By S. Inv, we can assume that S is normalized so that a(S) = eP, and by An, that P contains agent 1 and that in fact io = 1. x is the only weakly Pareto-optimal point of S with equal coordinates, say a. We have a > b.
The proof consists in constructing a division problem T involving the original members of P as well as some new agents, and such that each of them faces one subproblem identical to the one faced by agent I in S.
DIVISION OF FIXED SUPPLY AMONG GROWING POPULATION
Let P' _ P\{ 1), p2 and P3 be two elements of ? disjoint from each other as well as disjoint from P' and such that IP21 = Ip3 1 = ]P and let Q = P U P2 U P3. We construct T in I Q by first specifying its intersections with various subspaces of R Q of dimension equal to I P . First, let y' be a one-to-one function from P' to P2. For each i in P1, let Si C RP2+u(i) be defined by Si x E R P2U ( I13y E Ss.t.xi=y,
and Vj E P ,x =yj.
Si is a replica of S in which agent i plays the role played by agent 1 in S, and the agents in P2 play the role played by the agents in P 1. The operation that was just performed for each of the members of P' in relation to P2 is then successively carried out for each of the members of P2 in relation to P3, and for each of the members of P3 in relation to P'. More precisely, let y2 be a one-to-one function from P2 to P3, and for each i in P2 let S1 c RP3u{i) be defined by These inequalities yield FQ(T)< beQ. However, x* = aeQ belongs to T and since a > b, we obtain a violation of WPO. I
The argument is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 . In Figure 2 , it is schematically indicated with which group each agent is associated so as to face a division problem identical to that faced by agent 1 in S.
In Figure 3 , the case I P = 2 is illustrated somewhat more precisely, with P= {1,2,3}, P1 = 2,3 }, p2= {4,5}, P3= {6,7} and Q = {1, . . ., 7}. The division problem which is to be replicated involves agent io = 1, and agents 2 and 3. It is indicated 
